Icopal Holding A/S and Icopal a/s: A report on the merger
situation
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Summary
On 24 November 2000 the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry referred to the Competition Commission (CC) for investigation
and report (under the merger provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 (the
Act)) the acquisition of Icopal a/s (Icopal) by Icopal Holding A/Sformerly
named CAIK Holding af 13.06.2000 A/S, a consortium company formed by IKO
Sales Limited (IKO), Carlisle Companies Inc, Kirkbi A/S and Axcel IndustriInvestor
a/s.
Our terms of reference, at Appendix 1.1, ask us to answer
two questions:
- whether a merger situation qualifying for investigation has been
created by the acquisition; and
- if so, whether its creation operates against the public interest
or may be expected to do so.
We were required to report by 13 March 2001.
Icopal is a Danish holding company with subsidiaries
which produce a wide range of roofing materials in many parts of Europeincluding
the UKand the USA.
IKO, one of the members of the consortium company that
has acquired Icopal, is a Canadian company which also manufactures roofing
materials. It too has a wholly-owned UK subsidiary, Ruberoid plc.
IKOthrough its UK subsidiaryand Icopalthrough
its several UK subsidiarieseach has a significant share of sales
in the markets for bituminous flat-roof coverings (known as roofing felts),
pitched-roof underslatings (for fitting behind tiles as a second line
of protection from rain and dirt) and damp-proof courses (DPCs) in this
country.
There is only one other major UK manufacturer that supplies
products into all three of these markets, although there are two medium-sized
manufacturers that produce roofing felts and underslatings, and one large-scale
producer of DPCs. There are also significant imports of somealthough
not alltypes of roofing felts, and of underslatings.
On question (a) we concluded that a merger situation
qualifying for investigation had been created.
In answering (b) we adopted a two-stage approach.
We considered first whether the merger situation might lead to relationships
developing between IKO and Icopal which would encourage their mutual cooperation,
and thus bring about a reduction in the degree of competition between
their respective UK subsidiaries. We concluded that there were grounds
for a reasonable expectation that, if the parties were so minded, this
reduction would be likely to happen.
We then proceeded to consider the actual form that such
a cooperation might take, and the extent to which the parties would be
likely to benefit from it.
We concluded that there was no serious likelihood of
either party trying to withdraw from the supply of traditional roofing
felts in the next few yearsalthough this had been a concern raised
with us by one of their customers.
We considered whether the parties might contemplate cooperating
in raising, or otherwise manipulating, prices. The views of the members
charged with carrying out this inquiry separated at this point. The Chairman,
Professor Geroski, and Mr Bertram concluded that, although the merger
situation created a basis for a relationship that could be used to sustain
business contacts affecting competition in the marketplace, the structure
and the character of the UK markets for the relevant products, as they
have developed up to now, was likelyin the absence of fundamental
changesto preclude any detriment to the public interest.
So they went on to conclude that the creation of the
merger situation did not operate against the public interest, nor could
be expected to do so. As they form a majority of the members of the Group
constituted to consider this reference, their conclusion is to be regarded
as the CCs view in this inquiry.
Mr Garthwaite, whose minority view is set out in a supplementary
note to Chapter 2, concluded that the creation of the merger situation
might be expected to operate against the public interest.
Full text
Contents
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Part I
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Summary and Conclusions
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| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions
Supplementary
note by Mr Nicholas Garthwaite |
Part II
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Background and evidence
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| Chapter
3 |
The companies concerned and the acquisition |
| Chapter
4 |
The relevant markets and the effects of the acquisition |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of the main parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of the other parties |
Appendices
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| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and the background |
| 3.1 |
Chronology |
| 3.2 |
Ownership structure of Icopal before and after its acquisition
by CAIK |
| 3.3 |
IKO group structure |
| 3.4 |
Information from Icopal's last published annual report
prior to
delisting from Danish stock exchange
|
| 3.5 |
Icopal: principal products by division and country |
| 3.6 |
Icopal: subsidiaries and associates |
| 3.7 |
Icopal: profit and loss accounts |
| 3.8 |
Icopal: balance sheets |
| 3.9 |
Ruberoid plc group structure |
| 3.10 |
Ruberoid plc: profit and loss accounts |
| 3.11 |
Ruberoid plc: balance sheets |
| 3.12 |
Icopal Ltd: profit and loss accounts |
| 3.13 |
Icopal Ltd: balance sheets |
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