SCR-Sibelco SA and Fife Silica Sands Ltd and Fife
Resources Ltd: A report on the merger situation
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Summary
On 9 January 2001 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred
to this Commission for investigation and report the acquisition of Fife
Silica Sands Ltd (FSS) and Fife Resources Ltd (Fife Resources) (referred
to together as 'the Fife companies') by SCR-Sibelco SA (Sibelco) on 22
September 2000. The full terms of reference are set out in Appendix 1.1.
Sibelco, a global producer of silica sand and derived products, and
other industrial minerals and clays, is a private, family-owned company
registered in Belgium. Its total turnover in 1455 was some £764
million. In July 2000, Sibelco acquired Hepworth Minerals & Chemicals
Ltd (HMC), the UK's principal supplier of silica sand, from Hepworth PLC
and renamed it Sibelco Minerals & Chemicals Ltd (SMC). In our report
we use the name HMC/SMC to refer to the company both before and after
its acquisition by Sibelco. That acquisition was not referred to the Competition
Commission (CC).
Before their acquisition by Sibelco, the Fife companies were owned by
Anglo Pacific Group PLC (Anglo Pacific), a company involved in diverse
activities including mining and quarrying. FSS owns a sand quarry at Burrowine
Moor in Fife, Scotland, which started production in 1985. It produces
high-quality silica sand primarily for use in glassmaking, in particular
the manufacture of clear-glass containers. Fife Resources was incorporated
in 1997. Its main asset is freehold land and mineral rights at Burrowine
Moor.
The main types of sand product are, broadly, construction sand and industrial
or silica sand. Silica sand includes sand used for glassmaking but it
also embraces grades of sand used for a variety of other industrial uses.
Annual silica-sand usage in the UK is around 4 million tonnes in total,
of which sand for glassmaking accounts for around 1.7 million tonnes.
Annual usage of construction sand is typically around 40 to 45 million
tonnes. Construction sand fetches about £5 or less on a local delivered
basis. Silica sands can fetch anything from £10 to £50 a tonne,
depending on their quality.
In this inquiry, we are concerned primarily with the supply of sand
for glass manu-facture as opposed to other industrial uses. Glass sand
is low in iron and high in alumina. The three main types of glass for
which such sand is used are clear-container glass, float or flat glass
(for making windows) and coloured-container glass. Glass sand is also
used in the production of other glass products such as TV tubes, crystal
glass and ovenware.
Glass sand is a scarce resource. The main reason why Sibelco wished
to acquire the Fife companies was because they offered it the prospect
of significant glass-sand supplies over the longer term. In those parts
of the Fife companies' site where Sibelco has mineral extraction rights
and planning permission, there are thought by Sibelco to be resources
of up to [$] million tonnes of sand, which
could contain up to [$] million tonnes of
glass sand. In addition, it is currently estimated that there are possibly
50 million tonnes of glass-sand resources and a further 50 million tonnes
of other grades of sand in adjoining land where extraction rights and
planning permission have yet to be obtained.
From 1997 to 1455, FSS was experiencing losses before tax and in the
first part of 1455 Anglo Pacific decided to dispose of the Fife companies.
An auction by way of tender was held during the third quarter of 1455
and a number of companies, including Sibelco, expressed an interest. No
offer acceptable to Anglo Pacific was, however, made. In January 2000,
Sibelco began a series of discussions with Anglo Pacific and in June 2000,
the sale of the Fife com-panies to Sibelco was agreed. Anglo Pacific's
shareholders approved the disposal on 22 September 2000 and the shares
were transferred on that date.
In determining the relevant market for the purposes of our inquiry,
we noted that, while there is no scope for substitution on the supply
side, on the demand side there is the potential for a degree of substitution
between glass sands for some different manufacturing uses. We therefore
decided that the relevant market was that for all glass sand. As to the
geographic scope of the market, glass production plants in Yorkshire,
the main users of glass sand, are being or have in the recent past been
supplied from quarries as far away as Fife in Scotland and Reigate in
Surrey. There is almost no international trade in glass sand between Great
Britain and Continental Europe because of the costs of transportation,
and so no constraint on UK glass sand prices is provided by imports. We
therefore find that the relevant geographic market extends to, but is
no wider than, England and Scotland.
Most of the glass producers that took glass sand from FSS and HMC/SMC
before the merger have production plants in Yorkshire. HMC/SMC's four
glass-sand quarries that are located in central and northern England are
conveniently located for supplying them. Before the merger, during the
winter of 1455/2000, FSS had failed to secure new contracts for the supply
of glass sand from two of its former customers, Allied Glass Containers
Ltd and Beatson Clark plc. A third, Rexam Glass Barnsley Ltd (Rexam),
had reduced its purchases from FSS. All three companies had then switched
all or most of their requirements to HMC/SMC on longer-term contracts.
We found that the loss of these contracts was attributable partly to quality
problems with the sand that FSS delivered to these customers during 1998
and 1455, brought about by mismanagement of its quarry operations, and
partly to rising haulage costs, which were making FSS's sand less competitive.
Immediately before the merger, therefore, FSS was supplying only some
of Rexam's requirements in Yorkshire and those of the plant in Irvine,
Scotland, belonging to Rockware Glass Ltd. Sibelco submitted that, as
a result of the loss of almost all its Yorkshire business, FSS was no
longer an effective competitor to HMC/SMC before the merger and that therefore
the merger had not resulted in any loss of competition.
We were told by FSS's glass manufacturing customers that competition
between HMC/SMC and FSS before the merger had kept HMC/SMC's prices lower
than they would otherwise have been. Despite the quality problems it was
experiencing during 1998 and 1455, FSS was still actively negotiating
with its Yorkshire customers for orders in the latter part of 1455 and
the early months of 2000. In our view, HMC/SMC would have been unlikely
to offer two of these customers the favourable terms it did if FSS had
not been in the market actively competing for their business. We conclude
that, although in 1455/2000 FSS had lost much of its Yorkshire business,
it was competing with HMC/SMC before the merger.
Sibelco also maintained that FSS had been a failing firm before the
merger and that Anglo Pacific would have withdrawn financial support from
it, with the result that it would very soon have failed. We do not accept
this characterization. We conclude, first, that the sand quality problems
being experienced by FSS during 1998 and part of 1455 were attributable
largely to failures of management and that, by the time of the merger,
FSS was beginning to realize the benefits of new management put in at
the end of 1455. Second, in the short term, FSS could have continued to
operate on a cash-neutral basis. Third, for the medium to long term, there
are probable silica sand resources of around 50 million tonnes in areas
adjacent, or near, to the existing Burrowine quarry site. These resources
contain sand suitable for both container- and float-glass manufacture.
Such assets would have existed even in the absence of the merger. We conclude
that, if Sibelco had not acquired the Fife companies, they would have
been acquired by another company and remained a competitive force in the
supply of sand for container glass and become a new competitive force
in the supply of sand for float glass.
Sibelco, through HMC/SMC, had a 71 per cent share by volume and a [$]
per cent share by value of glass sand supplied to third parties in the
UK in 1455/2000. The acquisition of FSS increased those shares to 86 per
cent and [$] per cent respectively. Prices
in the UK are subject to individual negotiation; there are no price lists.
There is no likelihood in the short term of glass-sand prices being constrained
by imports. Moreover, there are severe constraints on new entry. Following
the merger and without the competitive constraint formerly exercised by
FSS in the market, we conclude that glass-sand prices may be expected
to be higher than would otherwise have been the case.
We considered whether any benefits might be expected to flow from the
merger. In this context we considered: Sibelco's reputation in the silica-sand
industry; whether the balance of production between glass sand and construction
sand at FSS would be significantly more in favour of glass sand if Sibelco
continued to own the Fife companies than if another purchaser were to
acquire them; environmental benefits in relation to the Fife companies'
site and sur-round-ing area; and employment prospects. We concluded that
there were no benefits flowing from the merger.
We conclude that the merger may be expected to operate against the public
interest in that, without the competitive constraint of FSS, glass-sand
prices in the UK may be expected to be higher than would otherwise have
been the case.
We considered various behavioural and structural remedies. We decided
that the most appropriate remedy to address the loss of competition brought
about by the merger would be the divestment of the Fife companies by Sibelco.
In the light of the evidence, we think it more likely than not that whoever
became the owner of the Fife companies would sell FSS's output to third
party customers. It is possible, however, that on or following a divestment
the Fife companies would be acquired by a company that chose to use FSS's
sand exclusively within its own group of companies. In that case, the
competition detriments would not be addressed, since an existing competitor
in the supply of glass sand would have been removed and would not have
been replaced, to the disadvantage of other customers in the market.
We accordingly recommend that Sibelco should be required to divest the
Fife companies. Sibelco should also undertake to divest the Fife companies
to a purchaser approved by the Director General of Fair Trading, within
six months of the publication of this report.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter
3 |
The companies and the merger situation |
| Chapter
4 |
The relevant markets and the effects of the merger |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of Sibelco |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of other interested parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 2.1 |
Issues Statement released on 12 February 2001 |
| 2.2 |
Remedies Statement released on 26 February 2001 |
| 3.1 |
FSS: summary profit and loss accounts, 1995 to 2000 |
| 3.2 |
FSS: balance sheets, 1995 to 2000 |
| 3.3 |
FSS: management accounts, 1998 to 2000, and budget for
2001 |
| 3.4 |
Acquisition by Sibelco of the Fife companies and the
silica-sand interests of Hepworth PLC |
| 4.1 |
Types of silica sand used in making glass |
| 4.2 |
The FSS quarry site and adjacent areas, its plant and
equipment and recent investment |
| 4.3 |
Glass recycling and cullet use in Great Britain |
| Glossary |
|
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